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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper seeks to explore the relationships held between international non-
governmental organizations, primarily based in the West, and Moroccan NGOs. The 
existing literature on the topic explores the ways in which international NGOs can 
both benefit and harm domestic NGOs, which seek to fix issues not thoroughly 
addressed and solved by the state or by the market, such as issues of gender-based 
violence, female education, and lack of rural healthcare. The data gathered was 
organized into two types of relationships; financial and non-financial. Financial 
relationships between INGOs and NGOs were often depicted as crucial in enabling 
critical projects, such as the first women’s shelter in Morocco and supplying 
transportation to decrease dropout rates of female students in rural areas; however 
the fine print restrictions imposed often took away from the end goal. Non-financial 
relationships between INGOs and NGOs took many forms, and included INGOs with 
both field offices in Morocco and those without. The consensus drawn from non-
financial collaborations was that Moroccan NGOs perceived these to be effective only 
with true and thorough collaboration, often depicting accounts of a horizontal 
relationship rather than the traditional power dynamic present in the literature. 
When INGOs did not have offices or staff in Morocco and made little attempts at 
horizontal or thorough collaboration, Moroccan NGOs tended to hold negative 
perceptions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words  
International Law and Relations, Political Science, Regional Studies: Middle East 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
 
I would like to thank both my academic director Taieb Belghazi, and my project 
advisor Stephanie Willman Bordat for their endless help and encouragement. I 
would also like to extend my thanks to all of the interviewees, whose patience and 
passion for the Moroccan civil society allowed this project to become what it is. 
Furthermore, a big thank you to my classmates in the Human Rights & 
Multiculturalism coursework for their endless wisdom and humor, and my sending 
International Relations advisor, Stacey Philbrick Yadav, for sparking my interest in 
IR in the very beginning, and for the continuous support ever since. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
Introduction  
International non-governmental organizations (such as Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House) are universally influential, especially with 
regards to their utilization of internet platforms to disseminate stories, photos, and 
campaigns to the general public. Accusations made by these organizations are used to 
pressure or shame governments into changing their tactics, especially surrounding 
human rights abuses, as well as bring awareness of such injustices to the larger global 
community. Funding given to domestic organizations by large INGOs can be critical in 
enabling changemaking practices. Moreover, data collected by these groups are utilized 
in deciding foreign policy and aid objectives, as well as shaping global opinions on 
ongoing atrocities. I was first introduced to Amnesty International’s and Freedom 
House’s annual reports on each country (specifically the “Freedom of the Press” and 
“State of the World’s Human Rights” reports) through a first-year collegiate assignment, 
and have been referred back to them countless times since.  
The sources of such information, and how this information is produced, must be 
taken into account when looking at these reports. These organizations (like any other) 
have inherent objectives and goals, such as self-preservation and institutional growth. In 
order to continue shining light to human rights violations being committed worldwide, 
these organizations must obtain enough funding to continue conducting research and 
enacting campaigns. There is a large body of research on these organizations and how 
their mandates and goals influence the crisis and situations they bring attention to, or 
choose to avoid. These decisions ultimately shape the discourse and body of thoughts 
and attentions in the human rights community, which has grown exponentially, to 
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include not only flagship organizations such as Amnesty International, but a global 
grassroots network of individuals engaged through social media and technology.  
This research project is focused on the impact and relationships between 
international NGOs and Moroccan NGOs. What are the perspectives held by Moroccan 
NGOs on the benefits (or lack of) of the work being done by these INGOs? What types of 
collaborations between international and domestic organizations are present in the 
Moroccan civil society sector? What challenges arise in these collaborations? Are these 
collaborations effective in creating change in Morocco?  
Abd Allah Ahmad Naim’s idea of “human rights dependency” argues that 
governments of developing countries are more likely to respond to international 
pressure than bottom-up pressure from local (domestic) NGOs. Furthermore, these 
domestic NGOs tend to seek publicity and funding from these international 
organizations, rather than from and within their own countries. Thus, it is crucial to 
examine the relationships between these two types of organizations – to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses – so these collaborations can become both more effective and 
more ethical. 
This research project is expected to be limited in depth, given the overall time 
constraints. From start to finish, this project took place over a period of four weeks. 
With more time allotted for the project, deeper access to the organizations may have 
been obtained, as well as larger, more in depth array of interviews. Based on the existing 
literature of the subject, the following hypotheses were formed:  
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Hypothesis 1: Moroccan NGOs would perceive INGOs to be acting on objectives 
of institutional survival or donor priorities, rather than in the best interest of their 
beneficiaries (Moroccan NGOs) 
 
Hypothesis 2: Moroccan NGOs would perceive collaborations with 
international organizations as ultimately beneficial in achieving their institutional goals  
 
In this paper, you will find (in order) a review of the existing literature on the 
subject, the methodology employed during the project, and the findings, divided into 
two sections: financial collaborations, and non-financial collaborations.  The appendices 
include copies of IRB consent forms, as well as interview questions employed during 
conversations with Moroccan NGOs, and then with international organizations. The 
bibliography contains all primary and secondary sources. 
 
Key Terms  
 
NGO: NGOs, or non-governmental organizations, are independent organizations 
without government control or influence (though they may receive government 
funding), typically established to address some type of social or political problem. Sheila 
Carapico (2000) defines NGOs in the Middle East as “agents of political, economic and 
social change, influencing the allocation of scarce resources in their own societies and 
the images national regimes project”.  
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Civil Society: The World Health Organization defines civil society as “the space for 
collective action around shared interests, purposes and values, generally distinct from 
government and commercial for-profit actors.” The civil society can also be referred to 
as the third sector, distinct from government and the market.  
 
 
Existing Literature 
The literature pertaining to NGOs is vast, with objective historical accounts of 
how and why these types of organizations proliferated in the late 1980s, the impact of 
organizational structures and mandates, the types of work done by such organizations, 
and case studies of specific instances of gross human rights abuses and the resulting 
response of the human rights community and specific INGOs. In this review, I will focus 
more on the rise of the civil society sector and NGOs, key internal problems affecting 
international NGOs and how they function today, and current external threats facing 
NGOs and other human rights organizations – such as the rise of populism and 
increased governmental crackdown on funding. Appropriate solutions to these issues, as 
argued for by the current body of literature, are also included. 
The rise of the civil society sector and the explosion of non-profit, non-
governmental organizations that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s is largely attributed to 
the failures of both the state and the market to alleviate issues such as poverty, and to 
contribute towards efforts at democratization and the promotion of a belief in 
fundamental human rights. Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International 
also grew exponentially during the time, using policies of “naming and shaming” to 
highlight international human rights abuses, beginning with those committed by the 
state (and later grew to include abuses by other perpetrators, such as spouses and 
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families in cases of gender based violence) (Ulltveit-Moe 2006, Wagle 1999). Under the 
umbrella term of non-governmental organizations, there exists several differentiations, 
primarily, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), which are typically 
headquartered in the global North, and domestically based NGOs, which focus on issues 
within the country of origin.  
Despite well-intentioned origins, a number of key issues began to arise within the 
civil society sector - specifically with the work of INGOs - such as unequal funding 
structures and extractive relationships with domestic NGOs, as well as advocacy tactics.  
INGOs, which are often institutionally based in the global North, typically receive 
substantially larger grants than domestic NGOs, on the basis that these domestic NGOs 
don’t have the capacity to handle the funding effectively (Barber and Bowie 2008). 
These funds can come from Western governments, foundations (such as the Ford 
Foundation), or individual donors and grassroots donations. Furthermore, the funds 
often come from wealthy Western donors, who value English speakers and standards of 
Western business practices when making large sum donations. Large organizations, as a 
means of institutional survival, can become dependent on donors and in the process  
may become contractors for these donors, rather than independent organizations 
themselves. (Banks and Hulme 2012).  
The donors themselves can engage in problematic acts, like writing contracts that 
allow for premature, sudden withdrawals of funding, leaving reliant domestic NGOs and 
their beneficiaries and staff hanging, participating in costly visits to the project sites 
(which takes efforts away from the goals in order to cater to the said donor), and 
pushing project goals towards the unsustainable short term. (Barber and Bowie 2008, 
D’Arcy 2019). 
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International NGOs partner with domestic NGOs when given grants, creating a 
top-down power structure, where the money and influence are concentrated unequally 
in international organizations. These structures are problematic in nature, with some 
instances of INGOs requiring extreme standards and imposing Western business 
practices that are asymmetric with non-western NGOs. These standards are difficult to 
meet for smaller NGOs and can arbitrarily absorb institutional efforts. Furthermore, 
local NGOs may not be credited appropriately for their contributions, allowing the 
INGO to receive disproportionate press and exposure for any successes. This then leads 
into a cycle of INGOs receiving more funding, continuing to get (disproportional) 
amounts of credit for their successes, and thus more press and resulting funding (as 
domestic NGOs are left behind).  
Thus, the existing literature suggests solutions to curb these problems. With 
regards to donors, contracts should be written that punish or disallow premature 
funding withdrawal, and donors should be made clear on the impacts of their visits as 
well as the harms with expecting short term results (D’Arcy 2019). Furthermore, 
domestic NGOs should seek funding from those they represent; “these organizations 
must start looking inward rather than solely outward for the resources they need to 
survive. If citizens are willing to pay for civil society, they may also be more willing to 
stand by it” (Depuy, Ron and Prakash 2016, 307). With regards to the top-down nature 
of INGO and NGO relationships, INGOs should focus more on equal relationships, and 
donors should (and are starting to) donate more directly to domestic NGOs. This both 
eliminates the harms of the intermediary relationship (Barber and Bowie 2008) and 
degrades the problematic belief that domestic organizations do not have the capacity to 
handle large grants.  
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The traditional “naming and shaming” practices of INGOs, as well as the 
“boomerang effect” of the transnational advocacy system have been key foci in the 
existing literature, specifically with regards to whether or not they are effective methods 
of change making, and furthermore, what quantifies success. Murdie and Davis (2012) 
claim that the method of naming and shaming is effective when combined with a large 
presence of domestic human rights institution, and with pressure from third party 
groups such as foreign governments. The combination of bottom-up pressure from 
domestic institutions, as well as top-down pressure from other governments (which 
could affect aid grants and reputation) creates effective change within human rights 
practices. However, Gresh questions what success looks like in the field of human rights 
abuses; the femicide of hundreds of women in Juarez, Mexico is attributed to the social 
unrest resulting from economic restructuring and the maquiladora industry. Amnesty 
International brought awareness to the negligent justice system and suggested for 
companies to install safety measures for their large population of female workers, rather 
than bringing attention to the underlying contributory economic factors (Gresh). At the 
time of writing, while the government had condemned the negligent actors, those 
responsible for the murders (as well as negligent police officers) had not been punished, 
and corrections were not made to the contributory economic factors. 
The boomerang effect starts with domestic NGOs spreading awareness and 
information, as well as calls for assistance, to international NGOs and the larger 
transnational advocacy network. INGOs then respond by bringing in support, funding, 
and connections to the domestic groups, in exchange for domestic legitimacy. INGOs 
can also aid in legal and medical funding for victims of state repression. INGO support 
assists domestic groups in mobilizing grassroots support, such as educating local 
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populations about human rights practices to increase domestic mobilization and thus 
increases overall bottom-up pressure (Murdie and Davis 2016). The boomerang 
approach can also emerge with Northern INGOs appealing to their governments to 
pressure culpable governments into compliance with human rights standards, adding to 
the third party pressure in a top-down manner (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  
In the Middle East and Northern Africa region, governments began to coopt the 
human rights movement in the early 1990s, adopting institutions such as the Moroccan 
Human Rights Advisory Council to “appease and coopt political allies and advisories, 
both local and international”, thus creating GO-NGOs, or government-organized NGOs, 
or quasi-NGOs (Cardenas and Flibbert 2005, Carapico 2000). Governments worldwide 
have also begun imposing certain restrictive measures on external sources of funding to 
non-governmental organizations, such as limitations on how much funding can be 
received or from whom (Depuy, Ron and Prakash 2016). The rise of populism has also 
threatened existing human rights organizations, with the decline of the Anglo-American 
world order, giving strength to the argument that the human rights ideology was 
imposed by Euro-America (Rodríguez-Garavito and Gomez 2018). Furthermore, (Keck 
and Sikkink’s) boomerang effect has also been losing effectiveness, as the idea of the 
Anglo-American traditional power centers of the world become eroded (and thus shame 
from said governments becomes less effective) and nationalism rises (Rodríguez-
Garavito and Gomez 2018).  
Nonetheless, these external threats challenging human rights organizations have 
solutions congruent to those argued for in response to the internal problems. Rodriguez-
Garavito suggests “we (human rights activists and organizations) must connect with new 
constituencies, combine online and offline mobilization, and develop horizontal forms 
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of collaboration between global North and global South organizations” to combat the 
global threat of populism. Similarly, to curb the presence of extractive relationships 
between INGOs and NGOs, horizontal relationships and a larger body of domestic 
grassroots donors must be cultivated. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Research Design  
 
 I began the research project selecting interviewees based on their employment or 
prior experience with either an International NGO or a domestic NGO based in 
Morocco. A majority of the contacts I started came from my academic director Taieb 
Belghazi and then snowballed out from there; who I interviewed suggested I talk to next. 
I conducted the majority of the research in Rabat, where a majority of the INGOs held 
field offices (if they had Moroccan field offices at all), and where a large sample of 
Moroccan NGOs were headquartered, such as MRA (Mobilizing Rights Association) or 
AMDH (The Moroccan Association for Human Rights). The locations of the interviews 
were left up to the interviewees, with the majority of them taking place at their 
workplace. Because we were discussing experiences they had in their work-life –  with 
interactions between INGOs and Moroccan NGOs – this was fitting.   
 
Research Limitations 
 Of all the challenges posed with the ISP research project, time and language were 
the two most evident. With four weeks given to conduct the project, reaching out, 
garnering more and more contacts through snowball methodology, and then setting up 
interviews, time became the primary obstacle. Furthermore, as I typically met subjects 
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in their workplaces, they had to fit me into their workplace schedule, restraining both 
the length of the interview and limiting when (usually scheduled far in advance) it could 
take place. For example, two of the contacts I reached out to were traveling for work, 
and wouldn’t be back in time to be interviewed in person.  
 Moreover, given the nature and structure of INGOs (most of which were 
headquartered in DC or London), the few with whom I was able to garner contact with 
was over email. Unfortunately, I couldn’t obtain interviews with these organizations, but 
forwarded my questions to be answered (see appendix). My calls to organizational 
headquarters (based in the West) were unanswered.  
 If the time span of the project was longer, I believe I would have been able to 
obtain a larger number of interviews, both from Moroccan sources and within 
international NGOs. Obtaining more interviews would allow me to get a larger, more in 
depth perspective and hit a point of saturation in the research, which did not occur 
during this project timeline. 
I spoke to all subjects in English, whether as a primary language or a secondary. I 
believe this presented an inherent sampling bias, for a number of reasons. Primarily, 
due to the nature of my relevant language skills, with a small amount of Arabic (not 
enough to conduct a conversation regarding these topics) and without any French 
language skills, this restrained the conversations I could have, especially with secondary 
English speakers. When communicating in French to set up the interviews and 
meetings, I offered the presence of a translator, which was refused. However, during the 
interviews, when recording, the subjects were informed they could speak in French, and 
I could have the information later translated by a classmate who spoke French. 
Interviewing speakers with limited English vocabulary, I’m sure there were aspects 
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missed due to the language barrier, which in some instances was alleviated by the option 
to speak French. 
Furthermore, those speaking English are typically highly educated college 
graduates and working for larger organizations may have a different perception of 
international organizations than non-English speakers working for smaller, rural NGOs. 
I attempted to counteract this sampling bias by speaking with those who had experience 
working with both smaller, rural NGOs and larger, urban-based NGOs. Nonetheless, a 
majority of the interviews took place in urban NGOs, which will ultimately affect the 
data found. Thus, I would argue that this project became more closely centered on the 
perspectives and experiences of urban Moroccan NGOs with International NGOs. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
With regards to consent, all in person interviews began with a discussion of the 
research project. The subject was then given time to read and sign the consent forms 
(see appendix). Over the phone and by email, I clarified the goals and intents of the 
project and in all cases obtained clear consent. In all interviews and conversations, I, the 
researcher, clarified that the subjects didn’t have to answer any question and could stop 
the interview at any time. At the end of the interview, I reiterated the subject of consent 
by asking how each subject would like to be referred to in the final paper citations and if 
they would like anything left out. All anecdotes found in the findings section are left 
confidential, but interviews are listed in the bibliography (with permission). 
All electronic data (such as interview recordings and transcriptions or PDF files 
of consent forms) was secured on a personal computer in an encrypted folder. All forms 
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of paper data (such as interview notes or paper consent forms) were stored securely in a 
safe space.  
 
Findings  
 The following section is divided into two segments, financial collaborations, and 
non-financial collaborations. Financial collaborations largely pertain to external funding 
given to Moroccan NGOs, given through an international NGO as an intermediary. Non-
financial collaborations refer to multiple types of collaborations between INGOs and 
NGOs, with the most effective being horizontally focused collaborations with in-country 
field offices of larger international organizations, on the understanding that these field 
offices have two-fold benefits; possessing and employing contextual knowledge while 
nonetheless retaining the resources of a large international organization. However, non-
financial collaborations also degraded the trust between INGOs and NGOs when 
appropriate financial compensation was absent. 
 
International Funding  
 
The role of international organizations as financial supporters of Moroccan NGOs 
was largely seen as beneficial, allowing the civil sector to alleviate problems not 
addressed by the state or the market -- such as female education, shelter from domestic 
abuse, and the role of women in government. However, the fine print restrictions that 
came with it could be too strict or take too much energy away from the end goal, 
especially with regards to small rural-based NGOs.  
A larger urban NGO, based in Casablanca, told me the story of their experience 
with funding associated with the European Union. They were running a project for the 
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promotion of women in government, and had a yearlong funding contract which 
included a promise on the completion of certain tasks each month. However, in 
November, following the election of these women, those elected were required to attend 
a number of meetings to decide who would be in certain government bureaus and were 
thus unavailable for meetings with the NGO. The meetings took place the following 
month. Nonetheless, the funding restrictions required the Moroccan organization to 
return that portion of the money, as the activity had not been completed in the time 
allocated (despite it being out of the hands of the said NGO). Out of desperation, 
because the funds had already been put toward their intended use, the organization was 
forced ask their members for donations in order to pay back the debt, despite the 
activity taking place and the end goal being fully accomplished. While there had been a 
contractual contingency plan if the tasks were to be delayed (where the NGO would file 
paperwork requesting permission), it was not clear the organization had known about 
this prior to being asked to return the funding. 
This account describes how funding coming from international organizations can 
be attributed in a top-down structure, where INGOs receive funds from foundations or 
Western governments, and then ‘partner’ with domestic NGOs. However, the 
partnership between these organizations is often not truly equal, as the funding and 
control lies in the hands of the international organization, rather than in equal control. 
Thus, when situations occur like the one aforementioned – out of the control of the 
domestic organization – the unequal aspects of the partnership are revealed. 
A different NGO – based in Rabat, focused on women’s rights – described how 
they received funding from INGOs based in Europe to build the first women’s shelter in 
Morocco. The funding grant was for three years in length, and fully funded buying the 
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property, furnishing it and acquiring all of the equipment necessary to run day to day 
activities. The funding was critical, and extremely helpful. Nonetheless, after three 
years, when the funding grant had ended, the NGO had expected the Moroccan 
government to begin financially assisting the shelter, as all start up costs had been 
covered. Furthermore, the NGO described how the EU had started funding much 
smaller projects, typically in rural based organizations, and thus couldn’t continue to 
fund the large project.  Regardless, the funding ended and the government failed to 
contribute financially and the NGO described the struggle it faces financially in keeping 
the shelter running.  
This expectation of government support could be drawn directly from the 2018 
Law against the Violence of Women, where the rights of women to be protected from 
“sexual, psychological, physical, and economic” violence are stated, and to be enforced 
by the government. Freedom of physical violence can be delivered through these 
shelters, which protect female victims of domestic violence.  
Accounts were also described of international funds (originating primarily from 
organizations in Spain) which allowed girls in rural villages to remain in school. Female 
high school dropout rates were high, as schools were often located far from the village 
and families worried about the safety of their daughters as they walked to school, and 
thus preferred they stayed home. The government had not solved this issue by providing 
for transportation, and thus the emerged the space for the civil society sector. The 
funding allowed local, rural NGOs to purchase buses and bikes, allowing for safe 
transportation, and consequently for them to remain in school.   
Some argued however, these fine print restrictions on funding weren’t a bad 
thing, given the large number of registered Moroccan NGOs, some of which existed 
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solely to receive subsidies from the government without doing beneficial work. 
Moreover, I heard the repeated narrative of some NGOs being corrupt, with INGOs 
being unable to trace where the funding went following delivery, leading to the overall 
unease of international donors in Morocco, and the stricter implementation of these 
restrictions and requirements. The argument could be made, with more research done, 
that the actions of some corrupt domestic NGOs in Morocco have led to the 
implemented restrictions on all.  
Conclusively, the role of international non-governmental organizations as 
financiers was largely beneficial in the completion and success of these projects. 
Nonetheless, strict regulations could be detrimental to both the Moroccan organizations 
and their efforts. While regulations were sometimes viewed as appropriate, due to the 
number of corrupt Moroccan NGOs, established, ongoing relationships between 
international and domestic organizations in the civil society, as well as more 
equalitarian, horizontal collaborations, could build trust and allow for less explicit 
contracts. Furthermore, Western donors should fund domestic NGOs explicitly, 
removing the harmful intermediary relationship that can arise between international 
and domestic organizations.  
 
Non-Financial Collaboration between International and Domestic Groups  
 The consensus on collaboration and support with international organizations 
favored organizations with field offices and teams in Morocco rather than those based 
internationally and attempting collaborations through short visits. In-country field 
offices (such as that of Amnesty Morocco) allowed these international organizations to 
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have a greater depth and impact in country, as recognized by the domestic organizations 
I spoke to, as well as horizontally based collaborations with domestic organizations.  
 I heard numerous accounts of the benefits of the work done by Amnesty 
Morocco, which has a field office in Rabat and employs Moroccan staff members. 
Activities include hosting educational sessions about human rights in schools, holding 
plays depicting human rights violations to raise awareness around the city, and 
organizing marches and press releases, such as that against the death penalty.  
 Furthermore, international organizations, such as Mobilizing Rights Association 
(MRA), that were based in country, rather than in the global north, held both 
advantages of strong relationships with domestic organizations as well as in country 
knowledge to produce effective campaigns. Furthermore, with an international staff, 
MRA is able access to grant proposals written in languages other than Darija, Fus’ha or 
French, and collaborate with donors based in the West or in embassies based in Rabat. 
 International organizations without satellite offices were often described as 
lacking the local context required to produce effective campaigns. Likewise, it was 
suggested that international groups should not attempt satellite domestic campaigns, 
which takes space away from domestic organizations. Instead, they should work on 
pressuring their own host governments to go through diplomatic channels. Nonetheless, 
given the current state of the United States, as well as the British, governments such 
pressure would currently be ineffective. 
 In discussions about unequal partnerships between international and domestic 
non-governmental organizations, some prominent Moroccan associations felt 
unaccounted for in the larger global discourse, which are often spearheaded by larger 
INGOs – some of whom publish annual reports on the state of Morocco (and other 
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nations in the world). These reports are widely circulated and utilized, especially by 
different governments and other international organizations, despite lacking regular 
collaboration (or any at all) with the Moroccan NGOs who possess primary knowledge 
and insights on the topic. 
 Other organizations said they had been expected by these larger INGOs (and 
their employees) to act in ways similar to a field office, despite no formal relationship or 
collaboration; in examples such as asking NGOs to use their established networks to 
promote campaigns or materials they had no part in creating, or by requesting these 
NGOs use their time and resources to translate documents, for the sole benefit of the 
INGO. Furthermore, with regards to the publication of annual reports, Freedom House 
responded (through email) that while the research analyst [concerned with the Morocco 
report] may “consult local NGOs to gather information that feeds into the country 
reports and scores”, few to no domestic organizations were cited in their report. 
 The one caveat to this conclusion was effective and thorough collaboration 
between international groups and domestic organizations. Domestic organizations 
argued the importance and effectiveness of collaboration with international 
organizations, when done horizontally. While the international online petition platform 
Avaaz is based in New York City, the Union de l’Action Feminine (UAF) described their 
effective collaboration, in which Avaaz collected over 50,000 online signatures in 2012 
in response to the suicide of Amina Filali, a 16 year old who killed herself after being 
forced to marry her rapist. The online petition protested article 475 of the Moroccan 
penal code, which allowed for a rapist to marry their victim to avoid persecution, 
typically to preserve the honor of the victim’s family (which would be degraded if the 
daughter’s virginity had been taken prior to marriage). The UAF invited Avaaz 
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representatives to Casablanca to participate in protests and demonstrations against 
article 475. The UAF cited their collaboration with Avaaz as critical in pressuring the 
Moroccan government to overturn the law, which has since been changed.  
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 This project explored both financial and non-financial relationships between 
international non-governmental organizations and Moroccan domestic organizations. 
With regards to financial relationships, the fine print regulations and restrictions often 
(arbitrarily) took away from beneficial relationships and the goals of projects. This was 
attributed both to maintaining strictly Western styles of business practice, as well as the 
presence of corrupt NGOs in Morocco, which have degraded trust networks between 
international and domestic organizations. To minimize the harm done, the literature 
suggests an emphasis on equal, horizontal relationships between international and 
domestic organizations, donating directly to domestic organizations to eliminate the 
harmful intermediary relationship, or incorporating standards of business practices 
found in the Middle East and Northern Africa region.  
 The non-financial collaborations held a variety of forms, from creating and 
sharing common knowledge to educational campaigns and partnerships that create 
more effective campaigns, such as the protests challenging Article 475. However, the 
unethical practices and effects of top-down ‘collaborations’ were more evident, with 
cases of prominent INGOs asking for pro-bono favors from domestic offices – such as 
the distribution of materials representing a campaign they didn’t create or even 
collaborate on. The domestic organizations I spoke with felt that they had been largely 
left out of the international conversation, despite having relevant skills and knowledge 
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to offer. Moreover, domestic organizations held the perception that they were often 
treated as a lesser-than partner by international groups, with examples of failures to 
recognize their contributions in the press or in published materials. 
 Most of these solutions are issued for, both in the existing literature as well as in 
this paper, international organizations. This is because they oftentimes hold the power, 
both in terms of recognition (in the media) and finances. To hold the power in such 
relationships, which are ultimately formed for the betterment of societal issues, means 
that organizations must take a critical look at the ethics of their practices and hold active 
responsibility in working towards fair practices. 
 The collected data disputes the first hypothesis, “Moroccan NGOs would perceive 
INGOs to be acting on objectives of institutional survival or donor priorities, rather than 
in the best interest of their beneficiaries (Moroccan NGOs)”.  In the majority of the 
interviews, respondents held the impression that international institutions were acting 
on the same objectives as domestic organizations – attempting to fix the societal issues 
at hand. However, it was clear that while organizations were not perceived to be acting 
directly on donor priorities, fine-print restrictions imposed through the top-down 
power structure ultimately took away from the end goals of the projects. 
 The second hypothesis, “Moroccan NGOs would perceive collaborations with 
international organizations as ultimately beneficial in achieving their institutional goals” 
was supported in some cases and disputed in others. The domestic organizations I spoke 
to tended to perceive benefits through financial collaborations or thoroughly 
collaborative non-financial coordinations. However, the domestic organizations I spoke 
to argued that non-financial collaborations, such as an expectation of pro-bono labor, 
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ultimately took efforts away from their own institutional goals and degraded trust in 
international organizations. 
 Retrospectively, the limitations of the study are primarily the time span and the 
resulting amounts of data collected. A broader range of data, with more interviews and 
surveys conducted in both international and Moroccan organizations, would further 
explore the types of relationships that are present in the Moroccan civil society. 
Furthermore, given the massive variety within both domestic and international 
organizations – the organizational structures, institutional goals and mandates, types of 
governments present in host countries, and funding structure – all relationships are 
subject to variation, both temporally and between specific organizations. Thus, the types 
of relationships explored here (financial and non-financial between international and 
domestic Moroccan organizations) may be different in other countries, even of those 
demographically similar to Morocco. Thus, future research should analyze these 
relationships in more depth and within other states, finding out similar styles and 
structures of what creates effective collaboration and produces change, and what 
doesn’t.  
Future research should also explore the relationship between external funding 
structures and hybrid regimes (such as Morocco’s). Within my own interviews, I found 
variations in sentiments about the trends of the Moroccan government and their 
regulations and interventions regarding foreign funding. While some divulged that it 
appeared the government was getting stricter, perhaps following the general rise of 
populism and government crackdown on human rights organizations (see Rodriguez-
Garavito and Gomez 2018), others disagreed.  
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Nevertheless, the project attempted here is far from complete and should be 
carried out to further lengths and depths in the future. The information gathered (and to 
be gathered) holds relevance both to domestic and international organizations, as well 
as the larger community -- which both benefits from and evaluates the actions done by 
the civil society sector. Ultimately, what produces the need for the civil society sector is 
the lack of government and market regulation or ability to solve the issues at hand. 
Nonetheless, given the current state of global politics and the rising trends of populism 
and declining government support for human rights organizations, the civil society 
sector will have at its hands both continual and new problems for which to find 
solutions; society at large would benefit from more ethical and sustainable 
collaborations in the search for said solutions. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Interview Questions 
Base Interview Questions for Moroccan NGOs / those with affiliation   
1. What international organizations has this organization collaborated with? Can 
you tell me a little bit about these projects? 
2. From your perspective, what impact do you think international NGOs (such as 
Freedom House, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, etc) have in 
Morocco? On change and reform?  
3. Do you think the work of INGOs (such as Freedom House’s or Amnesty 
International’s annual reports, or the Moroccan campaigns they conduct) have an 
impact on members of the government?  
4. Do you think the Moroccan government is more open or perceptive to challenges 
or critiques by domestic NGO actors, International NGOs, or third parties? Why? 
5. What kind of support (if any) do you get from these groups? 
6. What challenges do you typically perceive in these interactions? 
7. How could these interactions and coordinations be improved? How could they be 
made more effective? 
8.  What impact do you think these INGOs have in the region? 
9. What are your thoughts on the Moroccan government asking consulates and 
embassies to inform them of any funds given to Moroccan organizations? 
10. Can you tell me about how the Moroccan government perceives NGO interactions 
with INGOs?  
11.  Is there anything else I should know? 
 
Base Interview Questions for International Organizations (INGOs) 
 
1. What Moroccan NGOs does [this organization] get its information from (for 
example, to be published in an annual report)? What other sources does the 
MENA research team gather its information? 
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2.  Is there a research team in the ground in Morocco, or gathering data from 
abroad? If from abroad, what are the perceived limitations in information 
gathered?  
3.  Does [this organization] collaborate with Moroccan NGOs in coordination with 
domestic efforts led by such NGOs? 
4. What are some of the perceived challenges by the research team of coordinating 
and working with Moroccan domestic NGOs? 
5. What impact does [this organization] believe they have in Morocco? With whom, 
and what types of impact? 
6. What impact and significance does [this organization] believe they ought to have, 
and aim to have in the region? With whom, and why? 
7. Does the research team perceive pressure to coordinate with the current 
standards of International Human Rights rhetoric, that may be many steps of 
ahead of the dialogue in Morocco and in the MENA region?  
8. What evidence of success (from broad institutional goals) does [this organization] 
perceive in Morocco? What is [this organization’s] measures of success (if any)? 
9. Is there anything else I [the researcher] should know on a related level? 
 
Appendix B: Consent Forms 
 
(available in English and in French)  
 
Consent Form – English 
 
Statement of Consent 
 
Purpose of Study 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between international non-
governmental watchdog organizations (such as Amnesty International, Freedom House, 
and Human Rights Watch) with Moroccan domestic non-governmental organizations. 
The research aims to analyze the impacts of such organizations on the other’s work, the 
perspectives held, and the likewise.  
 
Duration and Elements of Study 
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The study will be conducted over a period of 4 weeks. It will include observations of 
participants as well as interviews and fieldwork.  
 
Risks 
The study has no foreseeable risks for participants.   However, if you feel uncomfortable 
with the observation or interview process at any time, you are free to terminate your 
involvement. 
 
Compensation 
Participation in this study will not be compensated, financially or otherwise. However, 
your assistance is greatly appreciated by our research team.  
 
Confidentiality 
Every effort to keep your personal information confidential will be made in this project. 
Your names and other identifying information may be changed in the final write-up, and 
will only be known to the research team.  
 
Participation  
 
I, the undersigned, have read the above statements.  I affirm that my participation in 
this study is voluntary and understand that I am free to withdraw my consent at any 
time without penalty.  
 
 
________________________________    ___________ 
                       Signature                   Date   
 
I recognize that this study involves interviews and/or observations that may be audio-
recorded and transcribed. 
 
 
________________________________    ___________ 
                       Signature                     Date 
 
 
Research Team: 
 
Julia Walters  
(p) +212 66 637 25 32  
(email) julia.walters@hws.edu 
 
Researchers may be contacted by e-mail or telephone for any reason. 
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Consent Form - French 
 
Déclaration de consentement 
 
L’objectif d’étude  
Le but de cette étude est d'examiner la relation entre les organisations non 
gouvernementales de surveillance (telles qu'Amnesty International, Freedom House et 
Human Rights Watch) avec les organisations non gouvernementales marocaines. La 
recherche vise à analyser les impacts de telles organisations sur le travail des autres, les 
perspectives exprimées, etc. 
 
La durée et les éléments d’étude  
Cette étude sera dirigée pendant une période de quatre semaines. L’étude inclura les 
observations et les interventions  des participants en incluant leur travail sur terrain.    
  
Les risques 
L'étude n'a aucun risque prévisible pour les participants. Cependant, si vous ne vous 
sentez pas confortable avec le procédé d'observation ou d'interview, vous êtes libre de 
terminer votre participation. 
 
Compensation 
La participation à cette étude ne sera pas compensée, financièrement ou autrement. 
Cependant, votre aide est considérablement appréciée par notre équipe de recherche. 
 
Confidentialité 
Tout effort de maintenir votre information personnelle confidentielle sera fait dans ce 
projet. Vos noms et toute autre information d'identification peuvent changés dans la 
description finale, et seulement connue à l équipe de recherche.  
 
Participation  
Je soussigné, ………………………………………….., confirme avoir  lu les rapports ci-dessus et 
compris que ma participation à cette étude est volontaire tout en ayant la liberté de 
retirer mon consentement à tout moment sans pénalité. 
 
________________________________    ___________ 
                       Signature                     Date 
 
J’ai pris conscience que cette étude puisse comporter les entrevues et/ou les 
observations qui peuvent être enregistrées et transcrites. 
 
________________________________    ___________ 
                       Signature                     Date 
 
Team de recherche  
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Les chercheurs peuvent être contactés par E-mail ou téléphone pour n'importe quelle 
raison ; 
 
Julia Walters 
+ 212 637 66 25 32 
Julia.walters@hws.edu 
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